RJVs in Product Innovation and Cartel Stability by Lambertini, Luca et al.
RJVs in Product Innovation
and Cartel Stability
Luca Lambertini Sougata Poddar
Department of Economics Indira Gandhi Institute
University of Bologna of Development Research
Strada Maggiore 45 Gen. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (E)
I-40125 Bologna, Italy Bombay 400065 India
fax : (39) 51 6402664 fax : (91) 22 840 2752
lamberti@spbo.unibo.it sougata@igidr.ac.in
&
Dan Sasaki
Department of Economics
University of Melbourne
Parkville, Victoria 3052 Australia
fax: (61) 3 9344 6899
dsasaki@cupid.ecom.unimelb.edu.au
September 1998
Acknowledgements
We thank the seminar audience at Centre for Industrial Economics, University of Copen-
hagen (May 1997) where all three authors were a±liated at the time we presented the
¯rst draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
Abstract
We characterise the interplay between ¯rms' decision in product development undertaken
through a research joing venture (RJV), and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour.
Participant ¯rms in an RJV face a trade-o® between saving the costs of product inno-
vation by developing similar products to one another, e.g. by sharing most of the basic
components of their products, and investing higher initial e®orts in product innovation in
order to develop more distinct products. We prove that the more the ¯rms' products are
distinct and thus less substitutable, the easier their collusion is to sustain in the marketing
supergame, either in prices (Bertrand) or in quantities (Cournot). This gives rise to a
non-monotone and discontinuous relationship between ¯rms' product portfolio and their
intertemporal preferences.
Keywords : R&D, supergame, collusion, optimal punishment, critical discount factor.
JEL classi¯cation : D43, L13, O31.
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1 Introduction
Both the current antitrust legislation and the literature appear to adopt a schizophrenic
attitude towards cooperation amongst ¯rms in R&D activities on one side, and collusion
in marketing on the other. Whilst public authorities explicitly prohibit collusive market
behaviour, there is scarce evidence that they discourage cooperation in R&D activities.
As to the latter, there indeed exist several examples of policy measures meant to stimulate
the formation of research joint ventures (RJVs henceforth).1 Analogous considerations
in favour of RJVs have been put forward by several authors (Grossman and Shapiro,
1986 ; Brodley, 1990 ; Jorde and Teece, 1990 ; Shapiro and Willig, 1990 ; and, for a general
appraisal, Tao and Wu, 1997). If cooperation in innovation activities may induce collusion
in the product market, then the above mentioned tendency to encourage cooperative R&D
but to discourage market collusion will render itself inconsistent.
In this paper, we model an RJV as a noncooperative two-stage game played by
participant ¯rms. The ¯rst stage (t = 0) concerns product development. The second
(t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢) is a supergame concerning market competition, either in quantities or in
prices, with time discounting with a constant factor ± . In particular, unlike most of the
existing literature on market supergames with heterogeneous products, we explicitly take
into account the e®ort-saving e®ects of the RJV in our model. Namely, even though each
¯rm develops its own product, multiple ¯rms can develop some, if not all, of the compo-
nents of their products jointly in attempt to save innovative e®orts. It is inevitable that
such an attempt makes their products partly similar, thereby increasingly substitutable.
The two polar cases are a full RJV in which the participant ¯rms develop all components
of their product jointly, and a null RJV where each ¯rm develops the whole of its product
independently. General cases are somewhere in between these two extremes, each ¯rm
developing some parts of its product independently.2 A full RJV minimises the initial
innovative e®ort exerted by each participant ¯rm, while it results in an entirely identical
product across ¯rms, making their ensuing market competition the most strenuous. As
the RJV becomes less and less \joint", involving each ¯rm's partially independent in-
1See the National Cooperative Research Act in the US ; EC Commission (1990) ; and, for Japan, Goto
and Wakasugi (1988).
2Partially joint product development can also be achieved without an explicit \venture" agreememt
negotiated between ¯rms. For example, almost all the leading PC (personal computer) manufacturers
(e.g., IBM, Compaq, Hewlett Packard) buy one main component, the pentium processer, from Intel
Corporation. These PC manufacturers do not invest seperately to produce such processors for their
machine. Yet one ¯rm di®erentiates its product from rival products by investing e®ort to develop other
features that makes its product distinct from rival ¯rms.
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novative e®orts, the initial cost of product development increases on one hand, and the
severity of the ensuing market competition decreases on the other because ¯rms are now
selling mutually distinct products.
Our game is fully noncooperative in that each ¯rm independently decides the degree
of its involvement in the RJV in the ¯rst stage.3 This choice variable having been exer-
cised by every ¯rm, both the amount of each ¯rm's initial innovative e®ort cost and the
degree of substitutability between ¯rms' products are automatically determined. Namely,
in this paper we abstract the joint process of multiple ¯rms' product development into
one strategic variable which is each ¯rm's involvement in the RJV, and two exogenous
functions of the pro¯le of the strategic variable across ¯rms : one determines the cost of
product development, which decreases in each ¯rm's involvement, and the other deter-
mines the degree of substitutability between ¯rms' products perceived on the demand
side, which obviously increases in each ¯rm's involvement in the RJV. The second stage,
the market supergame, is also fully noncooperative in that we consider only subgame
perfect equilibrium paths, whether the resulting prices and/or quantities are collusive or
generated by the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
Hereby intuitively, each ¯rm would decrease its involvement in the RJV as ± increases.
Each ¯rm's initial e®ort exerted in product development can be viewed as an investment
in attempt to ease the competition in the ensuing marketing stage. However, there is
a counterforce, which is the fact that the degree of product substitutability a®ects the
required level of ± in order for subgame perfection of collusive price and/or quantity paths
in the market supergame.
1. When ± is very low, ¯rms have no hope in sustaining implicit collusion in the
marketing supergame. Therefore, each ¯rm's involvement in the RJV decreases in
± .
2. When ± is intermediate, ¯rms have a strong incentive to keep up the degree of
product substitutability at that level which is su±cient in order to sustain a collusive
subgame perfect equilibrium in the ensuing market supergame. Since the threshold
in ± decreases in product substitutability, the higher ± is, the more substitutable the
¯rms' products are allowed to be, which allows each ¯rm to increase its involvement
in the RJV.
3In this paper we do not interpret an RJV as a uni¯ed decision making body who strives to maximise
the joint discounted pro¯ts among all participant ¯rms. Each ¯rm remains as a purely sel¯sh decision
maker irrespective of its involvement in the RJV.
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3. When ± is high enough for ¯rms to sustain collusion in the marketing supergame
irrespective of their product substitutability, each ¯rm's involvement in the RJV
again decreases in ± .
Hence we establish that each ¯rm's initial decision in product development is non-monotone
in ± .
The paper is organised as follows. The basic model is laid out in section 2. Firms' in-
teraction is closely analysed in section 3 in an equilibrium comparative statics framework,
focusing on symmetric pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. Then, wel-
fare implications are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper, summarising
our main qualitative ¯ndings and locating it in the context of the existing literature.
2 The setup
We consider the following two-stage game, played by two a priori identical ¯rms. Each
¯rm sells only one product. The ¯rst stage (t = 0) is for product innovation, where the
degree of substitutability between the two ¯rms' products is endogenously determined as a
result of the R&D decisions exercised noncooperatively by the two ¯rms. The second stage
is a supergame in marketing (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢), either in prices or in quantities. Throughout
the game, the discount factor ± is common to both ¯rms.
2.1 Second stage (super)game : Marketing with optimal pun-
ishment
In the second stage (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢), each ¯rm faces the following inverse demand function:
pi = 1¡ qi ¡ °qj (1)
in which ° 2 (0; 1] measures the degree of substitutability between the two ¯rms' products
(see Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984). By inverting (1), the direct demand function
obtains :
qi =
1
1 + °
¡ 1
1¡ °2pi +
°
1¡ °2 pj :
Marginal production cost is constant and thus normalised to zero.
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Let ¼M denote cartel pro¯t, and ¼NK one-shot Nash equilibrium pro¯t per ¯rm per
period, under the type of competition K. For future reference, it is useful to derive
explicitly here the threshold levels of the discount factor ±¤K(°) under both quantity and
price competition. Straightforward calculations are needed to derive the per period per
¯rm noncooperative pro¯ts (see Singh and Vives, 1984):
¼NC =
1
(2 + °)2
; ¼NB =
1¡ °
(2¡ °)2(1 + °): (2)
Obviously, the cartel pro¯t is the same in both settings, i.e., half the monopoly pro¯t:4
¼M =
1
4(1 + °)
: (3)
In establishing the critical threshold of the discount factor stabilising collusion under either
price or quantity competition, we apply Abreu's (1986, 1988) rule. Finding the optimal
punishment quantity qp or price pp, as well as the critical threshold of the discount factor
±¤K(°), involves solving the following system of simultaneous equations in the case of
Bertrand behaviour:
¼DB (p
M)¡ ¼M = ±¤B(°)(¼M ¡ ¼B(pp)) ; (4)
¼DB (p
p)¡ ¼B(pp) = ±¤B(°)(¼M ¡ ¼B(pp)) ; (5)
where ¼DB (p) is the pro¯t resulting from the one-shot best response when the other ¯rm
plays p , and ¼B(pp) denotes the pro¯t during the symmetric punishment period. The
solution to (4)-(5) is :
pp =
2¡ 3°
2(2¡ °) ; ±
¤
B(°) =
(2¡ °)2
16(1¡ °) 8° 2 (0;
p
3¡ 1] ;
pp =
(1¡ °)° +p2° ¡ 1¡ °3
°(2¡ °)
±¤B(°) =
(2¡ °)2(1¡ ° ¡ °2)
4¡ 8° + 4°3 ¡ °4 + 4°2p2° ¡ 1¡ °3
9>>=>>>; 8° 2 (
p
3¡ 1; 3
p
5¡ 5
2
] ;
pp =
1
2
¡
p
2°2 + ° ¡ 1
2°
; ±¤B(°) =
°2 + ° ¡ 1
2°2 + ° ¡ 1 8° 2 (
3
p
5¡ 5
2
; 1] :
The functional forms of both pp and ±¤B(°) shift at ° =
p
3¡ 1 , due to a non-negativity
constraint on the quantity being supplied by the cheated ¯rm during the deviation period
(see Deneckere, 1983 ; and Ross, 1992). Then, they shift again at ° = (3
p
5¡ 5)=2 , due
4In this paper we formally do not consider partial collusion, i.e., any collusion not at the monopoly
level. Taking partial collusion into consideration would not qualitatively a®ect our results, even though
it would considerably complicate algebraic operations.
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to the fact that a deviation in the punishment phase would never take place at a negative
price. When ° = 1, ¯rms are providing homogeneous products, so that ¼DB = 2¼
M
B and
¼NB = 0 ; hence, ±
¤
B)°) = 1=2 . Note that, at ° = 1 , the punishment price p
p is still strictly
negative (see Lambson, 1987).
Under Cournot competition, solving the system (in which the notation is analogous
to the previous Bertrand case)
¼DC (q
M)¡ ¼M = ±¤C(°)(¼M ¡ ¼C(qp)) ;
¼DC (q
p)¡ ¼C(qp) = ±¤C(°)(¼M ¡ ¼C(qp))
yields the optimal punishment quantity as well as the critical level of the discount factor
for all ° 2 (0; 1] :
qp =
2 + 3°
2(1 + °)(2 + °)
; ±¤C(°) =
(2 + °)2
16(1 + °)
:
2.2 First stage game : RJV in product development
Unlike previous contributions, we consider the choice of ° as a costly commitment. A
full RJV, where the two ¯rms jointly develop one product, economises R&D costs, while
leading to homogeneous products (° = 1) marketed in the future. The more independent
R&D e®orts each ¯rm exerts, the more distinct their resulting products will be. Therefore,
when ¯rms invent their new products at t = 0 , they face a tradeo® between the cost of
innovative investment and the increase in the stream of operative pro¯ts they may obtain
from the ensuing market supergame.
We abstract the negotiation process undertaken by the two ¯rms in deciding the
extent of jointness of the product innovation, e.g. which components of the two ¯rms'
products should be developed jointly and which else independently, into one strategic
variable exercised noncooperatively by each ¯rm. This variable, denoted by ºi (i = 1; 2)
hereinafter, can be conceptualised as the degree of ¯rm i's intended involvement in the
RJV between the two ¯rms. Once º1 and º2 have been submitted by the two ¯rms
mutually independently and noncooperatively, the negotiation between these two ¯rms
entails uniquely to the cost of product innovation per ¯rm ©[º1 ; º2] and the product
substitutability °[º1 ; º2] . These two functions, determined exogenously by given R&D
technology, satisfy symmetry, i.e.
©[º²; º²²] = ©[º²²; º²] ; °[º²; º²²] = °[º²²; º²] for any º²; º²²;
6
as well as
©1 · 0 ; ©2 · 0 ; ©11©22 ¸ ©12©21 ; °1 ¸ 0 ; °2 ¸ 0 ; °11°22 ¸ °12°21 (6)
which ensures asymptotic stability. It is also natural to assume constants k > 0 and °
such that
min
º1;º2
°[º1 ; º2] = ° ; max
º1;º2
°[º1 ; º2] = 1 ;
max
º1;º2
©[º1 ; º2] = k ; min
º1;º2
©[º1 ; º2] =
k
2
;
and that
°[º1 ; º2] = ° if and only if ©[º1 ; º2] = k ; (7)
°[º1 ; º2] = 1 if and only if ©[º1 ; º2] =
k
2
; (8)
where obviously (7) corresponds to the case of a null RJV, and (8) corresponds to the
case of a full RJV.
Note that these conditions on ©[¢; ¢] and °[¢; ¢] ensure the existence of a symmetric pure
strategy equilbrium º1 = º2 . Even though there does not necessarily exist a one-to-one
relation between ° and © , there is indeed a strictly monotone one-to-one relation between
them given º1 = º2 . We denote this monotone relation by °(©) hereinafter, which is a
strictly decreasing function.
3 Comparative statics results
At the development stage (t = 0), ¯rms choose their intention to be involved in the RJV,
º1 and º2 , simultaneously and mutually independently through non-cooperative decisions.
The game trees are as illustrated in ¯gures 1 and 2, in which the market supergame is
suppressed into a binary description of collusive and competitive outcomes. Discounted
pro¯ts are computed based upon (2) and (3) in the previous section.
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Figure 1 : RJV-Cournot game.
Firm 1³
³³
³³1
PPPPPq
)º1
Firm 2
³³
³³
³1
PPPPPq
)º2 ³
³³
³³
³³
³³³1
Collusion if
± ¸ ±¤C(°[º1 ; º2]) 1
4(1 + °[º1 ; º2])
¢ ±
1¡ ± ¡ ©[º1 ; º2]
PPPPPPPPPPq
Cournot-Nash if
± < ±¤C(°[º1 ; º2])
1
(2 + °[º1 ; º2])2
¢ ±
1¡ ± ¡ ©[º1 ; º2]
First stage : RJV (t = 0) Second stage :
Cournot supergame (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢)
Discounted pro¯ts per ¯rm
Figure 2 : RJV-Bertrand game.
Firm 1³
³³
³³1
PPPPPq
)º1
Firm 2
³³
³³
³1
PPPPPq
)º2 ³
³³
³³
³³
³³³1
Collusion if
± ¸ ±¤B(°[º1 ; º2]) 1
4(1 + °[º1 ; º2])
¢ ±
1¡ ± ¡ ©[º1 ; º2]
PPPPPPPPPPq
Bertrand-Nash if
± < ±¤B(°[º1 ; º2])
1¡ °[º1 ; º2]
(2¡ °[º1 ; º2])2(1 + °[º1 ; º2]) ¢
±
1¡ ±
¡©[º1 ; º2]
First stage : RJV (t = 0) Second stage :
Bertrand supergame (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢)
Discounted pro¯ts per ¯rm
In any symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, each ¯rm incurs the cost ©[º1 ; º2] in the
R&D stage (t = 0). In the marketing stage (t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢), each ¯rm's pro¯ts per period
¼M =
1
4(1 + °[º1 ; º2])
; ¼NC =
1
(2 + °[º1 ; º2])2
; ¼NB =
1¡ °[º1 ; º2]
(2¡ °[º1 ; º2])2(1 + °[º1 ; º2])
(see equations (2) and (3) in section 2) decrease monotonically in °[º1 ; º2] . Hence, by
assumption (6), the equilibrium ºi decreases monotonically, although it may or may not
be continuous, in ± . This observationally implies the following.
² Firms can sustain implicit collusion if and only if ± ¸ ±¤K(°[º1 ; º2]) . Over this
parametric range, the equilibrium ©[º1 ; º2] increases and the equilibrium °[º1 ; º2]
decreases monotonically in ± .
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² Firms cannot sustain implicit collusion over the range ± < ±¤K(°[º1 ; º2]) . Within
this range, again, the equilibrium ©[º1 ; º2] increases and the equilibrium °[º1 ; º2]
decreases monotonically in ± .
Figure 3 schematically plots the equilibrium venture investment © and the equilibrium
degree of substitutability ° , respectively, against ± . Both Cournot and Bertrand cases
lead to qualitatively similar diagrams.
In the left diagram, the relationship between © and ± is described. The whole space
is divided by the downward sloping locus ± = ±¤K(°(©)) . To the north-east of this lo-
cus, collusion is sustainable in the marketing stage. Within this region, the candidate
equilibrium level of innovative e®orts © increases monotonically, either continuously or
discontinuously, in ± . The diagram depicts the case where the graph TU of © smoothly
increases in ± . On the other hand, to the south-west of the critical locus ± = ±¤K(°(©)) ,
¯rms repeat one-shot Nash equilibria in the marketing stage.5 Within this region (note
that this region does not include the critical boundary), the candidate equilibrium level
of initial investment © increases monotonically in ± . Once again, the diagram represents
the graph of © with a smooth curve VW although © need not always be continuous in ± .
It is qualitatively clear that W should be situated to the north-west of T, and therefore
that the kinked locus WTU is an unambiguous part of the optimal © in response to ± .
To the west of W, ¯rms face the choice whether to sustain collusion by paying high initial
e®orts. The break-even point, denoted by ±X where each ¯rm's discounted pro¯t at X
equals that at Y, must lie between W and ±¤K(°) .
Hereby the optimal locus VX-YTU is established. Overall, the venture investment
increases as ¯rms become more forward looking, which is the reason why both loci TU
and VW are up-sloping. However, in an intermediate range of ± , where venture decisions
can a®ect future cartel stability, ¯rms choose the minimum level of © ensuring collusion
sustainability, unless the initial investment is excessively costly (to the upper-left of Y)
compared to discounted future gains.
5Our qualitative diagrams would stay similar even if we took into account partial collusion, in which
case the following scenario would arise. Firms collude at the monopoly level whenever possible, which
preserves our diagram intact to the north-east of the locus ± = ±¤K(°(©)) . To the south-west of the
locus where they are unable to sustain monopoly-level collusion, they choose partial collusion, i.e., the
most pro¯table collusion sustainable given ± and ° . Note that this makes marginal gains from ºi jump
discontinuously between these two regions. Hence, as long as ° and © are smooth in ºi , the graphs of
candidate equilibrium ° and © will always jump at the boundary ± = ±¤K(°(©)) .
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This analysis is translated in terms of the equilibrium degree of product substitutability
° in the right diagram. The degree of substitutability generally decreases in ± , except in
a small region to the right of ± = ±X , where the equilibrium ° rapidly increases in ± (the
interval [±X ; ±T ) in the diagrams). This is due to the fact that it is only in this region
that the sustainability of future collusion, be that in prices or in quantities, becomes the
binding factor in determining the degree of substitutability.
Figure 3 : Venture costs and substitutability as a function of ± .
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Hence, ¯rms' endogenous choice of º1 , º2 , and therefore the resulting amount of R&D
investment © and the degree of product substitutability ° , are both non-monotone and
discontinuous in their time discount factor ± .
Proposition 1 : There exist ±X and ±T , where ±¤K(°) < ±X < ±T < ±¤K(1) , such
that :6
² ¯rms' R&D investment increases and the endogenous degree of product substi-
tutability decreases in ± 2 [0; ±X) as well as in ± 2 (±T ; 1) , and vice versa in
± 2 (±X ; ±T ) ;
² both © and °(©) have a discontinuous jump at ±X , and a kink at ±T .
6The latter half of this proposition does not preclude the possibility that the loci of © and ° may have
jumps and kinks elsewhere.
10
4 Policy and welfare implications
In essence, the only component of social welfare which is neglected by ¯rms is consumer
surplus, computed as (per period t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢) :
SM =
1
4(1 + °(©))
in collusion;
SNC =
1 + °(©)
(2 + °(©))2
in Cournot-Nash ;
SNB =
1
(2¡ °(©))2(1 + °(©)) in Bertrand-Nash,
all of which decrease in °(©) and thus increase in © . Therefore ceteris paribus, consumer
surplus tends to be higher as the degree of product substitutability decreases.
4.1 An overview
When functions °[º1 ; º2] and ©[º1 ; º2] shift due to a technological progress or a policy
change, ¯rms' R&D decisions are a®ected accordingly. If R&D is subsidised, which shifts
©[¢; ¢] downward, ¯rms are encouraged to choose a lower ºi in the parametric region where
they would collude in the marketing stage, as well as in the region where they play one-shot
Nash in the market. This results in a decrement in the equilibrium level of ° .
The welfare implications can be illustrated in ¯gure 4. When the discount factor ±
takes an intermediate value with which the equilibrium ° is critically regulated by the
sustainability of later collusion, any intervention either encouraging or discouraging the
jointness of the RJV will induce no a±rmative reaction. On the other hand, if ± takes
those values with which ¯rms' market behaviour is una®ected by their initial choice of
ºi , the only determinant to the social welfare that is neglected by ¯rms' decentralised
decisions is the increment in consumer surplus due to product substitutability. Hence,
encouraging a decrement in product substitutability may represent a welfare improving
measure.
11
Figure 4 : Reaction to a reduction in ©[¢; ¢] .
6
-
0
1
±X 1
°
±
± = ±¤K(°)
(No shift.)
?
?
?
?
Hence, the following welfare characterisation can be given.
Proposition 2 : Total surplus can be improved by a downshift in ©[¢; ¢] when ± 2
[0; ±X) and when ± 2 (±T ; 1) .
Refer to section 3 and Proposition 1 about the de¯nition of ±X and ±T .
Proposition 2 recommends that R&D investment be encouraged through public policy.
This is indeed consistent with those commonly implemented policy measures to stimulate
product development, such as investment tax credits. Consequently, enhanced innovative
e®orts exerted by each ¯rm reduces the degree of product substitutability. In this sense,
the more R&D is encouraged, the less \joint" it becomes. This seems to contradict with
the widely observed tendency that public authorities often favour RJVs.
A natural curiosity here is : is there any situation where the jointness of the RJV
should be encouraged by policy measures ?
4.2 A closer insight
As shown in Proposition 1, the locus of the equilibrium © has a discontinuous jump at
± = ±X . This indicates the possibility that an incremental change in R&D subsidisation or
taxation could bring a substantial impact on ¯rms' venture decisions and on the resulting
social welfare when ± is in the neighbourhood of ±X . Even though Proposition 2 is
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operative over greater portions of the parametric space ± 2 [0; 1) , any marginal policy
alteration entails only a marginal perturbation in product development wherever the loci
of equilibrium © , ° are continuous.
By de¯nition, when ± = ±X , ¯rms are indi®erent between points X and Y in ¯gure 3.
Let ©X and ©Y denote the levels of investment per ¯rm at X and Y, respectively, where
obviously
©X < ©Y : (9)
Namely, in the Cournot game,
1
(2 + °(©X))2
¢ ±
X
1¡ ±X ¡ ©
X =
1
4(1 + °(©Y ))
¢ ±
X
1¡ ±X ¡ ©
Y : (10)
In the Bertrand game,
1¡ °(©X)
(2¡ °(©X))2(1 + °(©X)) ¢
±X
1¡ ±X ¡ ©
X =
1
4(1 + °(©Y ))
¢ ±
X
1¡ ±X ¡ ©
Y : (11)
The implications of inequality (9), equations (10) and (11) to the welfare rank between
outcomes X and Y are indecisive, depending upon the technological conditions incorpo-
rated in the speci¯c R&D cost function °(¢) . Therefore we must exhaust both possibili-
ties :
² X welfare-dominates Y if the social bene¯t of market competition outweighs that of
product variety. There are two ways to encourage outcomes near X as opposed to
those near Y.
One is to induce a positive shift in ±X . This is made possible by a policy that
either subsidises path VW or taxes on path YW in ¯gure 3. Since the latter incurs
higher R&D expenditures than the former, the policy is to make the costs of partial
independence in the RJV more progressive and thereby to encourage the jointness
of the RJV.
The other alternative is to induce a reduction in ¯rms' discount factor ± . This can
be attained either by a macroeconomic contraction policy that raises the interest
rate, or by an industrial regulation tightening corporate ¯nance.
² Y welfare-dominates X if the social bene¯t of reducing product substitutability
outweighs that of market competition. In this case it enhances welfare to encourage
outcomes in the neighbourhood of Y relative to those in the vicinity of X.
To this end, it is e®ective to induce a decrement in ±X . This is attained by a policy
that either penalises path VW or rewards path YW. Such a policy is to make the
13
costs of partial independence in the RJV more regressive and thereby to discourage
the jointness of the RJV.
Alternatively, an increment in ¯rms' discount factor ± can bring a similar e®ect. This
can be attained either by an expansionary macro policy that lowers the interest rate,
or by an industrial measure subsidising corporate ¯nance.
These observations should be summarised as follows, to complement the previous propo-
sition.
Proposition 3 : In the neighbourhood of ± = ±X , a small perturbation either in
the function °(¢) or in ± can bring a substantial change in welfare.
We hereby understand that the commonly observed tendency of seemingly schizophrenic
legislation, encouraging RJV on one hand while strictly discouraging market cartels on
the other (see section 1), may render itself either consistent or inconsistent depending
crucially upon two factors :
1. whether the bene¯t from reducing product substitutability is socially more impor-
tant than market competition, or vice versa,
2. whether the policy is to encourage overall e®orts in product innovation, or to en-
courage the jointness of R&D. Note that these two kinds of policy work in opposite
directions : the latter is to reduce the overall R&D expenditures.
Hence, whenever there is good reason to believe that the status quo is reasonably close
to ±X , the public authority should either :
² encourage overall R&D investment to reduce product substitutability, or
² encourage the jointness of product development to stimulate market competition.
5 Concluding remarks
We avail of a large number of contributions concerning ¯rms' incentives to undertake RJVs
in order to avoid e®ort duplication (Katz, 1986 ; d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, 1990 ;
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Katz and Ordover, 1990 ; Kamien et al., 1992 ; Suzumura, 1992 ; inter alia). Besides, there
exists a wide literature concerning the e®ects of product di®erentiation on the stability of
implicit collusion either in output levels or in prices (Deneckere, 1983 ; Chang, 1991, 1992 ;
Rothschild, 1992 ; Ross, 1992 ; Friedman and Thisse, 1993 ; HÄackner, 1994, 1995, 1996 ;
Lambertini, 1997 ; inter alia). So far, however, few serious attempts have been made to
interconnect these two streams of research, except for Martin (1995) and Cabral (1996).
The former takes into account an RJV aimed at achieving a process innovation for an
existing product which is marketed by ¯rms through Cournot behaviour. Cabral proves
the existence of cases where competitive pricing is needed to sustain more e±cient R&D
agreements. On the other hand, Martin's analysis shows that cartel stability is enhanced
by the presence of cooperation in process innovation, so that the welfare advantage of the
RJV by eliminating e®ort duplication can be jeopardised by the arising of collusion in the
ensuing market phase. Our e®ort in this paper serves to clarify potential implications of
Martin's work to the case of product innovation, in lieu of process innovation.
The particular bene¯t from discussing product innovation is that we can interlink the
strategic aspects of R&D with the e®ect of inter-¯rm product portfolios in the ensuing
marketing stage. In this paper we have mapped the e®ects of both intertemporal prefer-
ences and the technology of product development on ¯rms' venture decisions as well as on
their market behaviour over the entire parameter space. Contrary to some of the earlier
beliefs, we have established that the relationship between product substitutability and
the discount factor can indeed be both non-monotone and discontinuous. This seemingly
counterintuitive result stems from the balance between cost considerations in product
development and ¯rms' concern towards future cartel stability.
Note also that product innovation, unlike process innovation, has a direct e®ect on
consumers' surplus by a®ecting the product portfolio in the market. In fact, our non-
monotonicity and discontinuity results carry over to welfare implications. Namely, as
long as ¯rms' collusive inclination in their market behaviour stays una®ected, it marginally
enhances welfare to encourage independent product development beyond ¯rms' private
incentives. On the contrary, if the status quo happens to be near the parity between ¯rms'
collusive and non-collusive incentives, then an incremental alteration in R&D policy | ei-
ther to encourage or to discourage the jointness of the RJV | can entail a discontinuously
massive impact on welfare.
15
References
Abreu, D.J. (1986), \External Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames", Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 39, 191-225.
Abreu, D.J. (1988), \On the Theory of In¯nitely Repeated Games with Discounting",
Econometrica, 56, 383-96.
Brodley, J.F. (1990), \Antitrust Law and Innovation Cooperation", Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 4, 97-112.
Cabral, L.M.B. (1996), \R&D Alliances as Non-Cooperative Supergames", CEPR Dis-
cussion Paper No. 1439.
Chang, M.H. (1991), \The E®ects of Product Di®erentiation on Collusive Pricing", In-
ternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 9, 453-69.
Chang, M.H. (1992), \Intertemporal Product Choice and Its E®ects on Collusive Firm
Behavior", International Economic Review, 33, 773-93.
d'Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin (1988), \Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in
Duopoly with Spillovers", American Economic Review, 78, 1133-7.
d'Aspremont, C. and A. Jacquemin (1990), \Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in
Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum", American Economic Review, 80, 641-2.
Deneckere, R. (1983), \Duopoly Supergames with Product Di®erentiation", Economics
Letters, 11, 37-42.
Dixit, A.K. (1979), \A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers", Bell
Journal of Economics, 10, 20-32.
EC Commission (1990), Competition Law in the European Communities, Volume I,
Rules Applicable to Undertakings, Brussels-Luxembourg, EC Commission.
Friedman, J.W. and J.-F. Thisse (1993), \Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product
Di®erentiation", RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 631-45.
Goto, A. and R. Wakasugi (1988), \Technology Policy", in Komiya, R., M. Okuno and
K. Suzumura (eds.), Industrial Policy of Japan, New York, Academic Press.
Grossman, G. and C. Shapiro (1986), \Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis",
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2, 315-37.
16
HÄackner, J. (1994), \Collusive Pricing in Markets for Vertically Di®erentiated Products",
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 155-77.
HÄackner, J. (1995), \Endogenous Product Design in an In¯nitely Repeated Game",
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13, 277-99.
HÄackner, J. (1996), \Optimal Symmetric Punishments in a Bertrand Di®erentiated Prod-
uct Duopoly", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 611-30.
Jorde, T.M. and D.J. Teece (1990), \Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Com-
petition and Antitrust", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 75-96.
Kamien, M., E. Muller and I. Zang (1992), \Cooperative Joint Ventures and R&D
Cartels", American Economic Review, 82, 1293-1306.
Katz, M.L. (1986), \An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development", RAND
Journal of Economics, 17, 527-43.
Katz M.L. and J.A. Ordover (1990), \R&D Cooperation and Competition", Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 0 (Special issue), 137-91.
Lambertini, L. (1997), \Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games", Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 77, 181-91.
Lambson, V.E. (1987), \Optimal Penal Codes in Price-Setting Supergames with Capac-
ity Constraints", Review of Economic Studies, 54, 385-97.
Martin, S. (1995), \R&D Joint Ventures and Tacit Product Market Collusion", European
Journal of Political Economy, 11, 733-41.
Ross, T.W. (1992), \Cartel Stability and Product Di®erentiation", International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 10, 1-13.
Rothschild, R. (1992), \On the Sustainability of Collusion in Di®erentiated Duopolies",
Economics Letters, 40, 33-7.
Shapiro, C. and R. Willig (1990), \On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint
Ventures", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 113-30.
Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984), \Price and Quantity Competition in a Di®erentiated
Duopoly", RAND Journal of Economics, 15, 546-54.
Suzumura, K. (1992), \Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with
Spillovers", American Economic Review, 82, 1307-20.
17
Tao, Z. and C. Wu (1997), \On the Organization of Cooperative Research and Develop-
ment", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 573-96.
18
